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Summary findings
Over the past 10 years the three Baltic republics have  The author's  analysis shows that the Baltic projects
undertaken  significant restructuring of their banking  were valuable initiatives that could in principle be
sectors, supported  by the World Bank through three  replicated in other transition or developing economies
projects: the Financial Institutions Development Project  whose banking sector faces serious restructuring
in Estonia, the Enterprise and Financial Sector  challenges. A development-oriented equity investment,
Restructuring Project in Latvia, and the Enterprise and  like that made by SFM, can address the important
Financial Sector Project in Lithuania. These projects  deficiencies in a banking sector that is still in a
included a credit line, channeled through local  rudimentary state, lacking both capital and banking
commercial banks, to provide long-term funding and  skills. SFM's most effective tool was the imposition of
complementary technical assistance to private  sound corporate governance on the institutions that
enterprises. In parallel, the government of Sweden  received the equity injection. This approach provided a
injected equity into the commercial banks from  powerful supplement to the banking supervisory
Swedfund Financial Markets (SFM). The projects and the  functions. Rather than relying on the external
accompanying Swedfund equity were aimed at  enforcement power of state supervision, SFM targeted
promoting sound banking systems in the three Baltic  internal processes to change business practices. As a
countries-by  strengthening the equity in the banks and  result, the DEI led to improvements in the corporate
thereby expanding medium- and long-term financing.  culture and broader risk management and thus in the
Meigas examines the role of SFM-which  provides  quality of banking services-not  only meeting the
development-oriented  equity investment (DEI) to Baltic  institutional development objectives but also ensurinuC  an
banks-in  the context of the World Bank programs. She  adequate return on the invested capital.
examines the arguments for deploying DEI as a  The potential of good corporate governance for  . ising
development vehicle by gauging its impact in the three  the work of banking supervisors has been stressed by the
Baltic countries on banking skills and services, on  Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. This potential
capitalization, and on shareholder structure and board  is particularly valuable in countries still developing the
membership. She draws out the role of technical  supervisory function, and DEI, the author argues, is well
assistance and compares its impact with that of DEI, and  suited for thc task of improving corporate governance.
explores the possibilities offered by DEI for imposing
sound corporate governance. The author also describes
the necessary ingredients for successful DEI.
This paper-a  product of the Private and Financial Sectors Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-
is part of a larger effort in the region to disseminate the results of successful  policy initiatives in the financial sector. Copies
of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Sylvia
Torres,  room  H6-216,  telephone  202-473-9012,  fax 202-522-0005,  email address  storres@worldbank.org.  Policy
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may be contacted  at
helo_meigas@'mckinsey.com.  November 2001.  (23 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminzates  the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
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countries they represent.
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The Baltic Republics have gone through a remarkable process of transition over the last ten
years, not least in their banking sectors where each country has essentially had to start from
scratch.  Banking systems as we know them in the West simply did not exist prior to 1990.
Banking transition has, as a result, been a long and bumpy road.  Progress has often been
punctuated by banking crises that has set the financial sectors back.  But significant progress
has nonetheless been made and foreign investors have recently shown confidence in the
emerging banking systems by taking major equity stakes in banks in all three countries.
The Baltic countries have been aided in their financial transition by the International
Financial Institutions, by the European Union and by a large number of bilateral donors.  This
paper examines the experience of one quite unique partnership in the banking area, that
between the World Bank and the Govemment of Sweden.
During the mid 1990s the Bank prepared financial sector projects in each of the three Baltic
Republics, aimed primarily  at the restructuring and institutional strengthening of the banking
sector.  The Bank was partnered by the Government of Sweden through the establishment of
Swedfund Financial Markets, a development oriented equity fund structured to invest in
emerging Baltic banks.
The overarching question that this paper seeks to address is how successful was that
partnership in reaching its goal of facilitating a restructuring and strengthening of the Baltic
banking sectors.  To obtain objectivity in making this assessment the Bank and the
Government of Sweden engaged Helo Meigas-former  Deputy Governor of the Bank of
Estonia-to  undertake the study.  She has seen the results of the Bank's work, and that of
Swedfund, from the special perspective of a recipient country.  The Bank and the
Government of Sweden are very grateful for the extensive research that has been undertaken
by Mrs. Meigas and for the high quality of the analysis that is reflected in the paper that
follows.
Alexander Fleming
Europe and Central Asia Regional Office
World Bank, Washington DCEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Significant restructuring has taken place in the banking sectors of the Baltic Republics
over the past ten years.  This was supported by the World Bank in the context of three
projects:  the Financial Institutions Development Project in Estonia, the Enterprise and
Financial Sector Restructuring Project in Latvia, and the Enterprise and Financial Sector
Project in Lithuania.  These projects contained a credit line, channeled through local
commercial banks, to provide long-term funding and complementary technical assistance to
private enterprises.  In parallel with the credit lines was an equity injection into the
commercial banks from the Government  of Sweden Swedfund Financial Markets (SFM).
The aim of the projects, and the accompanying Swedfund equity, was to promote a sound
banking system in the three Baltic countries through strengthening the equity in the banks in
order to produce a larger volume of medium-term and long-term financing.  The purpose of
this paper is to examine the role of SFM - which essentially provides development oriented
equity investment (DEI) to Baltic banks - in the context of the World Bank programs.
The analysis in the paper illustrates that the projects were very valuable initiatives,
which could in principle be replicated in other transition or developing countries where the
banking sector is facing serious restructuring challenges.  A DEI, like that made by SFM, is
well positioned to address the very important deficiencies in a banking sector still in a
rudimentary state, lacking both capital and banking skills.  SFM's most effective tool for
achieving the development objectives was imposing sound corporate governance on the
institutions that received the equity injection.  Such approach enabled to provide a powerful
supplementary tool to the banking supervisory functions. Instead of using external
enforcement power of state supervision, the internal processes were targeted to achieve
change in business practices. As a result, improvement in corporate culture and broader risk
management was achieved, leading to the significant improvement in the quality of the
banking services. This enabled not only the institutional development  objectives to be met but
also an adequate return on the invested capital to be earned. The potential of good corporate
governance in making the work of supervisors easier has been stressed by the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision. As such, it is even more valuable in countries, where the
supervisor function is only developing and DEI as a vehicle is well suited for this task.
The first part of the paper examines the arguments for deploying DEI as a
development vehicle.  It addresses this issue through gauging the impact on the level of
banking skills and services in the three Baltic countries.  The impact on the level of
capitalization as well as shareholder structure and board membership is also described.  The
role of technical assistance (TA) and its limitations vis-a-vis a DET are drawn out.  Finally,
the possibilities that DEI bring for imposing sound corporate governance are explored.
The second part of the paper describes the ingredients needed to achieve success in a
DEI.  First, the DEI partners, like the donor country, other assistance projects, multinational
or bilateral public equity investors as well as the host authorities are discussed.  Secondly, the
importance of appropriate organizational  structure in adopting a commercial approach into
managing the investment is analyzed. Thirdly, the elements of a suitable environment for a
DEI are discussed.I.  INTRODUCTION
1.1  Since  re-establishing  independence  in 1991,  the Governments  in all three Baltic
Republics  moved  rapidly to break up the Soviet  banking  system. A large number  of new
private banks were licensed  and banking  supervision  functions  within  the central  banks  were
established. But despite  that, even in 1994,  the banking  sector  was still in very rudimentary
stage. A significant  proportion  of banking sector  assets  were still state owned and foreign
presence  was very limited. The state owned  banks, if accounts  were compiled  in accordance
with International  Accounting  Standards,  would  have been deemed  insolvent. There was  a
severe  shortage  of modern  banking skills in credit risk assessment  and asset liability
management  as in the planned economy  banks acted as fiscal agents and not as independent
allocators  of resources. The banks' capital  bases were too small to support  the rising demand
for credit from the enterprise  sector.
1.2  In order to address  these issues  the World  Bank (WB), in partnership  with the
Government  of Sweden,  initiated three comprehensive  projects  in the banking  sector of the
Baltic countries  over the period 1995-1999. The Financial  Institutions  Development  Project
in Estonia,  the Enterprise  and Financial  Sector  Restructuring  Project in Latvia, and the
Enterprise  and Financial  Sector Project  in Lithuania  all included  a credit line channeled
through commercial  banks to provide  long-term  funding  to private enterprises.  Supportive
technical  assistance  programs were also provided. These  projects were accompanied  by
equity injections  from a Swedish  Government  fund--Swedfund  Financial  Markets  (SFM).
The aim of the projects  was to promote a sound  banking  system in the three Baltic countries
through strengthening  the equity in the banks in order to catalyse  a larger volume  of medium-
term and long-term  financing. SFM  was to focus  the support  on private banks or state  banks
under privatization,  both of which in principle  should  qualify  for loans from the WB. The
equity contribution  was planned as a start-up  support  which would gradually  be replaced  by
capital infusions  from the private sector.
1.3  This paper aims to assess the impact these  three projects  have had on the
development  of the banking  sector in the Baltic  countries  and assess the extent such
partnerships  could  be replicable in other countries. The  paper analyses  how such a
development  oriented  equity investment,  by imposing  sound  corporate governance,  can
yield results  which are superior  to a regular  technical  assistance  support and the paper
lists issues  that need to be addressed  in order to achieve  such an outcome. The
experience  gained in the Baltic countries  through the SFM  experience  points to the
potency  of this innovative  development  instrument,  which  has a potential to make a
sustainable  impact  in the banking field in other developing  or transitional  economies.
1.4  For the purposes  of the study, the Bank Staff Appraisal  Reports and the
Implementation  Completion  Reports for all three projects  have been studied. Site  visits
were made  to the three Baltic countries  to meet with the representatives  of the banks
which received  the equity  injection  and the credit line. Meetings  also took place with
the authorities  responsible  for banking sector development  in the Baltic states. In
addition, staff  of SFM and the World Bank, as well as the representatives  of the
Government  of Sweden,  were interviewed.
III.  BUILDING  THE CASE FOR DEVELOPMENT  ORIENTED EQUITY INVESTMENTS
2.1  When a country is moving from central planning to a market economy, it faces a vast
array of structural reforms that must be undertaken.  In order to support the reform process,
assistance projects were typically initiated both by multinational organizations as well as
through bilateral  arrangements.  Given the central importance of financial sector reforms,
significant development work is always undertaken in the banking sector, mostly in the form
of technical assistance given to the authorities for putting in place the needed legal and
regulatory framework.  But a more innovative approach-making  a development oriented
equity investment (DEI) in combination with other initiatives-should  doubtless be given
more prominence  (see Box I below).  The experience gained in the Baltic countries with the
World Bank credit lines (see Box 2 on following page), which were combined both with
equity investment from a donor country and TA from various sources, allows one to conclude
that such combinations can be highly successful.
2.2  In order to see the impact a DEI can have in an emerging banking sector, it is
important to note that the banking sector at the initial stage lacks both the capital as well as
the skills for its adequate development.  Capital is essential for increasing the volume of
financial intermediation.  Typically the volume of such intermediation, in relation to the size
of a transitional economy, is well below that in the western economy of equivalent size.
Skills are critical for controlling the risks that come with increasing business volumes.
Providing technical assistance through making available experts in different areas may not be
the most efficient and direct way of handling these deficiencies.  TA is valuable to the
financial authorities in establishing the regulatory environment, but if there is a weak banking
supervisory authority it is very hard to change business practices.  The advantage of a DEI is
that it brings the capital and the skills through imposing corporate govemance as a tool for
initiating and implementing the changes from within the banks.  The rest of the section of the
paper examines in more detail why a DEI can be a superior development instrument in
transitional economy banking sectors.
2Box 2.  World Bank credit line facility
In 1994 financial  sector  development  projects were initiated  by the World  Bank in all three Baltic
states.  In their detailed  structure  the projects  differed  slightly  from country  to country  but the general
objective  was the same for all of them -strengthening  the banking  system.  The credit  line facility  was
designed  to deliver  finance  to support  the development  of private  and privatized  enterprises,  by providing
financial  resources  through qualified  participating  banks for medium-term  loans to private enterprises.  TA
was  designed  to complement  the credit  line in order to improve the capacity of both  the banking system  to
deliver  such resources,  and of enterprises  to prepare plans  to secure  them.  Banks underwent  comprehensive
and tailored  institutional  development  programs  and had to undertake  audits  in accordance  with International
Accounting  and Auditing  Standards.  The equity component  was included  in the project  to increase  the
capitalization  of the banking sector,  providing  therefore  the own funds necessary  for the growth  of the loan
portfolio.
Within  the framework  of the Financial  Institutions  Development  Project USD 10  million  was
allocated  for Estonia.  For Latvia,  under  the Enterprise  and Financial  Sector  Restructuring  Project a USD 35
million loan was approved.  Lithuania.  meanwhile  obtained the Enterprise  and Financial  Sector  Assistance
Project of USD 25 million.
Special units were established  in each country  with a responsibility  to select  banks that would
qualify  for the credit  line, conclude  subsidiary  loan agreements  with them,  and authorize  loan disbursements.
In some cases funds had been made  available  also from other  donor countries  to finance  the work  of those
specialized  units. In Lithuania,  the Apex  unit  was established  in the Bank of Lithuania  to act as a credit  line
manager,  educating  local bankers  in the credit and risk analysis  procedures. It also managed  a twinning
arrangement  between Lithuanian  banks and banks from Western Europe. In Latvia,  a Technical  Unit was
established,  which in addition  to its main functions,  played  an important  role  in providing  more general
financial  sector advisory  services and in monitoring  the banks. In Estonia,  the Project Implementation  Unit
under  the Ministry  of Finance, did  not play a significant  role. But the Core Advisors  Group, compiled  under
the auspices  of the WB credit line,  provided  extensive  institutional  development  support  by offering
assistance  and advice  to all the banks which sought their guidance.
The results of the credit  line were different  for each Baltic state.  In Estonia,  only  one sub-loan was
financed  from the credit line.  The last  disbursement  for the loan was made  on February  1997.  The bulk of the
credit line,  USD 7.7 million, was cancelled  in July 1997 upon  the request  of the Govemment  of Estonia.  The
Implementation  Completion  Report  for Estonia  recognized  that the momentum  for  the credit line had passed.
Increased  activity of EBRD  in the country  and the acquisition  of a rating from the international  rating
agencies  provided  banks with access  to private  markets, which were providing  funding  at better rates and
easier  terms.
In Latvia  and in Lithuania  the credit lines  were also structured  to provide  (in addition  to investment
loans) working  capital  loans to companies  which suffered  from the lack of liquidity  during the banking
crises.  As the banking  sector weakened  in Latvia and Lithuania,  and eventually  went into  a severe  crisis in
1996,  there was a need for assistance  to address  the insolvency  of the state-owned  banks and the distress
experienced  by a number  of the remaining  large state-owned  enterprises.  By the end of the project  all funds
were disbursed  and the Implementation  Completion  Reports for the projects  have evaluated  the credit  lines to
be highly  successful  in reaching a substantial  number  of enterprises.  In Latvia,  five  commercial  banks were
participated  and made a total of 303 commercial  loans to their clients.  Of the total disbursements,  61% was
for project  finance purposes,  39 % for working capital  purposes.  The average  sub-loan  maturity was about
three years. In Lithuania,  three  banks were used to make loans which benefited  a total of 40 companies.
Assessing the level of banking skills
2.3  Within  a centrally  planned  economy,  there  were  virtually  no modem  banking  skills.
When  building  market-based  banking  everything  had  to be  developed  from  scratch:  through
the privatization  of the whole  or parts  of  state  owned  banks,  by supporting  the  establishment
3of new private banks, and by encouraging the entrance of foreign banks into the local market.
It is only in the case of foreign banks, where the skills to run a banking business are made
immediately available together with the capital, that skills can be embeded quickly. But the
impact the establishment of a foreign bank would have on the local banking market in earlv
years, was in practice very limitedl.
2.4  Banks, as providers of trade finance in their early stage of financial transition, initially
grew out of the industrial sector, where the logic of running a business was very different
from the knowledge needed in financial intermediation. The management of banks consisted
of either recent graduates with no work experience, or an older generation who had general
managerial expertise but very little knowledge about risk management in a financial
institution. The banking knowledge was not much better at the board level2 and as a result
very little guidance was available from the shareholders. The majority of the board usuallv
consisted of the top managers of the clients (i.e. industrial sector), who were invited onto the
Board by the bank's  management in order to keep the cash-flow of that enterprise within their
bank only. Sometimes Board members were politicians or civil servants who were either
connected to a big industrial group or, because of their position, were able to direct the flowv
of public funds. Their ability to assess the adequacy of the management decisions, and the
level of competence involved in making decisions related to banking specific issues, was
limited.
2.5  Although there was much learning-by-doing, the level of experience and knowledge
within banks took time to develop.  There was very little term lending undertaken.  Instead
funds were provided for trade finance based on the resale of Russian commodities and
metals, which were priced below international levels (i.e. there were significant price
distortions). Even in the cases where the banks felt relatively secure about the long-term
credit risk of the loans, the loans were structured as short-term loans which were rolled over
with renegotiated interest rates. Even if credit lines from multinational agencies had been
provided, there was a general lack of demand for such lending.
2.6  Thus the nature of banking business in the early days of transition did not motivate
the management of banks to either train themselves, or their employees, in the basic skills of
credit risk analysis and project evaluation. It was only when large scale price distortions had
been eliminated and businesses started to search for more long-term projects, that term
lending began to grow. Unfortunately, the problems inherent in this type of loan would
I  At the outset there were only very few foreign bank representative  offices opened in the Baltic countries,  none of which
was licensed to offer banking services.  In Lithuania, three state owned  banks, 25 commercial  banks (all locally owned and
only 8 of them could be characterized  as active banks) and a development  bank had been  established. State owned banks
accounted for nearly 50 % of the market share.  In Latvia, the previous branch network  of the Soviet Specialized  Bank, was
unified into one bank (Unibanka) to be privatized  with some branches  to be sold  to private  banks. The state owned  Savings
Bank held the bulk of household deposits.  The private banking sector,  which was holding 77% of the total banking sector
assets, was dominated by a few large banks.  There was  also a large number of very small banks, established as captive
funding devices for state enterprises.  In Estonia,  the banking sector consisted  of 18 commercial  banks, two state owned
banks (of which the Savings  Bank was 67 percent state owned)  and a development  bank. The firm reaction of the
Govemment  to the banking  crises in late 1992 had had a positive  effect on the sector, but deposit accumulation  was still slow
(This is as it was seen during the time when the Staff Appraisal Reports  for each country were compiled  (see references).
2  In all three countries,  for the joint  stock companies,  the corporate  law envisages a separate  supervisory  board and the
management board with no overlapping  members.  For the purposes of the present paper, the supervisory board,  as the
highest governing body of a company  after the shareholder's  meeting, is called the board,  and the management  board,  which
consists  of executive members  only, is referred  to as the management.
4become evident only a few years after if had been granted. And in those years it was often the
case that a rapid growth from a very low base would lead to a prolonged boom period, when
excessive risks were taken without any concern about the potential threats that might arise
during a recession period. Only when real losses start to occur would management start to
understand the importance of credit risk analysis and project evaluation skills.
Determining the capitalization of the banking sector
2.7  In an emerging market economy the legal, regulatory and supervisory framework is in
need of development from first principles. Both the general accounting laws and the banking
specific legal acts that would enable an assessment of the value of assets correctly, and record
all the liabilities appropriately, are inadequate. Also the auditor's profession is only just
evolving. As a result it is very likely that the value of a bank's  capital is not truly recorded in
its books.
2.8  Because of limited banking skills, the judgments banks make about the
creditworthiness of its borrowers are often wrong. Problems arise when banks fail to
recognize impaired assets, do not create reserves for writing off these assets, and do not
suspend recognition of interest income. Often it is not intentional misrepresentation to the
supervisors and shareholders, but more due to the lack of appropriate management
information systems that would give details on the conditions of the loan portfolio. The lack
of liquidity in the markets makes the valuation of collateral very difficult. There is also a lack
of skills in assessing the value of impaired loans, as well as an inadequacy of the regulations
that prescribe the size of loan loss reserves. As a result, it is very likely that during these
periods the value of banks assets is not adequately recorded in the books and that the loan-
loss provisions are not sufficient to absorb the future losses from the loan book.
2.9  Credit risk in the loan portfolio is not the only source of misrepresentation in the
balance sheet. The market risk in the trading book is is not often accurately  recorded because
stock markets in their early stages are illiquid and volatile. The regulations that would require
daily marking-to-market are often inadequate, giving banks the possibility to leave the losses
from changes in stock prices unrecorded. Off-balance sheet exposures are left unrecorded and
no capital is held against the contingent risks they retain. The regulation recognizing the links
between different parties is insufficient and, as a result, large exposures are not properly
recorded and capital is not allocated to these specific risks.
2.10  The standard of accounting and auditing work in emerging markets is not comparable
to that in western countries.  Some of the deficiencies are objective, resulting from the
problems in evaluating the assets and recording the liabilities, as noted above.  In addition, a
significant shortcoming is the lack of experienced accountants and auditors.  Like the banks
themselves, accountants and auditors are also still learning their profession.  A proof of that
are several examples of banks in the Baltic Republics that had been closed by the authorities
due to excessive risk taking. The report of the temporary trustee, which had been made for
the bankruptcy court, had often shown the bank to be deeply insolvent not only as a result of
those specific risks that had caused the closure, but also because of the misrepresentation of
the value of certain assets or the existence of some unrecorded liabilities. That is why in these
5early years, when the auditors' profession is still evolving, more caution is warranted in
relation to the audited accounts.
Where can technical assistance have the best impact?
2.11  Giving assistance to the financial authorities is the most widely used form of TA, as
the knowledge among government officials about the operations of the financial markets is
very low. In the Baltic countries, a wide range of TA projects were initiated with help from
various sources 3. In areas with a direct impact on the banking sector, TA encompassed help
in drafting new accounting, commercial and central bank laws. Work in non-banking areas
also contributed to sound banking, like improvements to bankruptcy legislation and on
developing collateral legislation for both movables and immovables.
2.12  The role of the World Bank projects in the TA to govemments was primarily that of a
coordinator. The WB staff preparing the projects coordinated with several other agencies
operating in the region, trying to ensure that there was complementarily with  no overlapping
of responsibilities. If necessary, additional TA in issues that had been neglected by other
donors was provided by the Bank. Because in some countries preconditions were set prior to
their launch, the WB projects also managed to act as motivators, persuading the governments
to work more actively in certain areas. In Latvia, the administrative procedures for
bankruptcy legislation and public access to registers, titles and rights of commercial entities
were implemented under the Project. The law on collateral and loan security was delayed, but
submitted finally in 1998. In Lithuania, the policy actions requested as a precondition
included enactment of new banking legislation, a program to strengthen banking supervision
and an enactment of a scheme to phase in tax deductibility of bank loan loss provisions. In
Estonia no specific preconditions were set by the WB project, but assistance was given by
different agencies to the drafting of a new accounting law, on the work on land registries and
on bringing the commercial banks'  accounting and reporting in line with internationally
accepted standards.  In all three countries the project insisted on the introduction of audits of
banks in accordance with International Accounting and Auditing Standards and in the
preparation of the accounts of banks in accordance with these standards.
2.13  Typically there was only a few technical assistance programs  that were directed
towards the banks themselves. Out of the several initiatives undertaken in the TA area, the
more long-term projects--where the confidence and trust can be built between the parties--
were found to be most useful. Efficient and comprehensive institutional development was
sometimes implemented in the form of twinning programs, financed by EU Phare and
bilateral donors.  These allowed not only provided advice to the banks on appropriate
regulation, but also worked closely with them on implementation issues. One proof of the
success of twinning arrangements was the fact that several banks, at their own initiative and
expense, continued co-operation with the twinning partner long after the program had ended.
The WB projects in the Baltic Republics had recognized the need to give TA directly to the
borrowing banks, and the success of its TA initiatives should be attributed to the fact that the
programs were specifically designed to reach the banks themselves. In the evaluations of the
3  The main providers of TA in the Baltic countries  financial  sector restructuring  projects  have been,  in addition  to the
Swedish  Government, the Governments  of Denmark,  Netherlands,  Canada and Norway, EU-Phare,  USAID.
6WB projects, the TA provided over the lifetime of the project had been assessed as meeting
the needs of the banking sector 4. Most of the work with the banks was done through the
special units that were established to manage the credit line part of the project (See also Box
2).
2.14  In Estonia, a Core Advisors Group--established under the World Bank projects--was
working directly with the banks. Being on site for two years, and having the necessary
expertise, it was able to make banks implement new internal regulations that were more
comprehensive  than what at that time was required by the regulators. Effective TA was given
to the banks in credit analysis, internal audit and treasury operations. In Latvia, the Technical
Unit worked closely with several banks in assisting them to design and implement credit
analysis procedures and practices.  The most success was achieved with the detailed TA
given to Unibanka, which was a formerly state-owned bank with the largest market share in
Latvia.  This TA included significant institutional development support and assistance in its
privatization process. In Lithuania the Apex unit was mostly focused on teaching the banks to
prepare projects for the WB credit line but ABN AMRO, Unibank/ING and Norwegian
Banking Resources worked directly with the banks.
2.15  In addition to the TA given by those special units, much effort went into the
disbursement of the credit line. There was condierable interest in the credit lines during the
banking crises in the Latvia and Lithuania; when the liquidity in the banking sector was very
low because  of the loss of confidence among businesses. During this period the conditions of
the credit line (in Latvia) were changed to provide working capital loans as well as
investment loans. After the banking sector had stabilized, medium-term funds had become
available from EBRD and private parties. The WB credit line, because of its pricing as well
as the complexity of its procurement procedures, was not attractive to banks any more. The
question may be asked if, when the market failure in that sense did not exist any more, the
example of Estonia should have been pursued, where the credit line was cancelled. Only if
the spread and/or the fees from the lending activity are necessary to cover the costs of the
consultants working on-site, is the continuation of such lending activity justified.
2.16  There were several beneficial side-effects of having a credit line in place. Firstly, it
served as a motivation to the banks to receive and implement the TA that was set as a
precondition to the disbursement of the funds. In the Baltics, to qualify as a participating
financial intermediary, banks underwent comprehensive and tailored institutional
development programs. Secondly, the learning process in preparing sub-projects for final
borrowers of the credit line, was evaluated as useful by the banks. The application procedures
to obtain sub-loans caused banks, after initial complaints about difficult procedures, to
improve their credit and risk analysis procedures by developing and implementing advanced
analysis methods for project evaluation. Thirdly, the information that was gathered during the
due diligence process when the banks were evaluated against the pre-set criteria, and during
monitoring the banks throughout the credit line life-time, was considered critical by the SFM
in doing its own equity investments (see the discussion of it in Chapter 2). Fourthly, the
4  The Implementation  Completion  Reports prepared by the World Bank to analyze the outcomes of the projects  found the
work done to strengthen  the banking sector,  especially the institution building aspect of the three projects highly successful
and sustainable.  The report for Estonia has been  issued in November  1998, for Latvia in March 2000  and for Lithuania in
February 200 1.
7qualification for the WB credit line served as a quality stamp, which at the stage, when the
banks were not rated by international rating agencies, helped them to access private markets.
How can corporate governance  help where  technical  assistance  fails?
2.17  Substantial  amount of TA work is usually directed towards increasing the efficiency
of the supervisory agencies. Unfortunately, very often the results will take a long time to be
seen. The primary reason is the complexity of the work of the banking supervision function.
The fact that supervision is always a public service, which typically gets paid under the civil
servants salary scale did not help to attract talents into this line of work. That is why targeting
improvements in corporate govemance should be used to assist the supervisors. Inherently,
the interests of the shareholders, which aim at earning an adequate return on their
investments, are the same as the objectives of the supervisors. Only with adequate risk
management, which is essential for running sound banking operations, can the viability and
long-term profitability of the business be assured. There needs to be an understanding at the
shareholders level about the relevance of the regulations and the urgency of implementing the
necessary internal control systems. Without that, the work of the supervision is very difficult,
if not impossible. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, the necessary banking experience is
very scarce on the board level in a locally owned bank.
2.18  It is only in recent years that more emphasis has been given to corporate governance
issues. In a recent paper "Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations"
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision it is stated that supervisory
experience underscores the necessity of having the appropriate levels of accountability and
checks and balances within each bank, as sound corporate govemance makes the work of
supervisors infinitely easier. It is even more important when the supervision function is weak
and not trusted by the banks.
2.19  When looking at the elements of good corporate governance in more detail, one can
easily find reasons why its level is low in an emerging banking sector. Establishing strategic
objectives and a set of corporate values for a bank is not always a priority issue at the stage
when all the management time is devoted to day-to-day client relationships.  This is
especially the case when there are profit opportunities in vastly unregulated markets with
high price distortions, and when concepts like conflicts of interest and arm's  length principle
are not recognized. Setting and enforcing clear lines of accountability and responsibility  is
difficult when the number of knowledgeable people is limited and when any system of
control is regarded as a demonstration of mistrust. The idea that the board is ultimately
responsible for the operations and financial soundness of the bank is hard to promote when
legal acts have defined their duties to be very general and management is not eager to share
any of the powers, making instead every effort to keep the board away from information and
the strategic decisions. Often this results in the board not being comfortable in questioning
the management, which has been able to make itself seem indispensable  to the survival of
the bank. The importance of the audit function (both internal and external) is not always
clear, especially to the management who, as they have been running the bank since its
establishment, feel that they have a full knowledge about the bank, its operations and
financial situation. The compensation and the bonus system of the senior management is
often not consistent with the bank's  financial results and objectives, and the board does not
8feel strong enough to interfere because of the fear of loosing the management. The issues of
transparency and keeping banking secrets are deliberately interpreted as being in conflict with
each other, so very little information is given out from the bank.
2.20  The experience in the Baltic countries, with corporate governance implemented in
part by the SFM, serves as a good opportunity to learn about what can be done by a
knowledgeable minority investor and also about issues where additional support from the
outside is needed. It is quite evident that after a strategic investor had become a shareholder,
further changes are made because of the greater control a strategic investor enjoys over the
activities of the bank. That is why, when analyzing the achievements of SFM and other
financial investors in a pre-strategic investor period, the difficulty of the task they were
facing should not be underestimated. It is especially in the early stages of development when
the shareholder structure is weak, and the interests of different shareholders are not in line
with each other, that the management has full control not only of the bank's  day-to-day
business but also of its strategic decisions. Any interference from the shareholders is
considered a sign of hostility and treated as such. Even sharing more detailed information
about the financial positions of the bank may be considered as a first step towards giving
away that independence. That is why for a board member not only the deep knowledge in the
banking issues is necessary, but persistence and perseverance are equally important. All this
was also relevant in the case of the SFM investments.
2.21  SFM representatives had a seat on the board of almost all the banks where it had
made an investrnent. At the times when SFM had been an investor there were several
areas were significant progress was achieved. Firstly, achieving systematic and open
communication with shareholders-- both on the board meetings as well as through
public disclosure--was a major step further (the publication of detailed annual accounts
was also a result of the improvements in the securities market regulation). Information
provided by the management to the board grew in its complexity as the knowledge
within the board itself increased by having representatives of foreign investors like SFM
and the EBRD as members. Significant progress was made in increasing  transparency
in the shareholder structure, including the disclosure of financial interests of the
management. Major emphasis had been put on this both by SFM when making its
investments, as well as by the WB, when qualifying the banks for the credit line, to
reducing or eliminating connected lending. In order to identify irregularities in the
business and spot transactions that were not made on an arms-length principle, the
precondition for the investments was the full disclosure of the shareholders and their
transactions. In some instances it had even led to the requirement to unwind the irregular
transactions before any SFM investment could have been made. Secondly, there was
improvement in strategic planning as a result of which well-articulated corporate
strategies were produced. Because of the long-term nature of the SFM investment, and
its intention to exit through a sale to a strategic investor, the board became much more
involved in strategic issues. And last but not least, in several instances the senior
management's compensation schemes were changed. Excessive bonuses--that in many
cases were not even dependent on the bank's  performance--were cancelled to make
them consistent with the bank's  objectives and long- and short-tern  financial results.
This was not only to avoid unnecessary expenditures but above all to keep the
motivation of the management in line with the objectives of the shareholders.
92.22  In addition to the areas where significant improvement had been achieved, there were
also issues were progress was not so evident. There are two main reasons for this. First of all,
as a financial investor with less than 10% stake in a bank, and in several cases with no other
board member to support the similar objectives, it is very difficult--if not  impossible--to
initiate changes which require from the board both a deternined  and continuous effort as well
as deep knowledge about banking issues. That is why in issues related to risk management
the improvements were not as profound, especially in the banks where foreign shareholders
had a minority of seats on the board. In instances where SFM was the only foreign member,
the choice it had to make was whether to push for changes where no other board member
would have an understanding of the necessity for action and as a result of that risk isolation
and conflict, or keep up communication with the management and postpone the necessary
changes. In several instances it was more reasonable and constructive to do the latter, and this
was the route chosen by SFM in some instances.
2.23  Because of the lack of clarity in the legislation about the division of powers and duties
between the management and the board, it was always an issue that was heavily debated
internally, especially when drafting the by-laws of the bank. In many instances, in the first
stage of development in a life of an enterprise, the shareholders are the founders of the firm
and also responsible for the day-to-day management of it. In the early days of transition there
was no understanding about what a board is good for and in the parliamentary discussions
there was significant resistance from the entrepreneurial  sector to give any real power to the
board. That is why in the Commercial Codes the role of the board was defined to be very
general and limited. When new outside shareholders would come in and try to change the
situation, through for instance, defining the role of the board in more detail in the by-laws of
the bank, there was resistance from the management which would back its arguments with
the logic of the Commercial Code.
2.24  As a result of that, and despite efforts made by SFM and other similar shareholders,
progress was not made in putting in place adequate internal control systems and in increasing
the role of the board in the risk management of the bank. Enhancing the independence and
stature of an internal audit department, and making it report directly to the board was
considered by the management as a demonstration of mistrust to them and fiercely resisted.
The importance of compliance procedures was not understood by the management as the
enforcement powers of the supervisory agencies were weak and neither the financial risk nor
the reputational risk from sanctions resulting from the violations of the laws were considered
important. Because of the lack of powers and knowledge among the vast majority of
members of the board, the direct involvement of the supervisory board in establishing and
approving risk policies for the banks (e.g. investment and exposure limits) was never
achieved. The need to establish risk management functions independent of business lines was
realised only after major losses were incurred by the banks, in the aftermath of the Asian
crises in 1997 and in the Russian crises in 1998.
2.25  Lack of progress in improving internal control systems and risk management in the
bank should certainly not be considered a failure of SFM or other shareholders with similar
mandate. The task they were facing was too difficult. However, outside support from the
regulatory bodies at the stage when only financial investors are available, would have had a
significant effect on what they could achieve. In Estonia, it was only after the legal
framework that supports the involvement of the supervisory board was adopted that the by-
10laws of the banks were changed to reflect the adequate division of powers and duties between
the management and the supervisory board.5 The understanding about corporate governance
and internal control systems among the industry itself is very low. That is why initiating
discussions in the industry (e.g. banking associations) on corporate govemance matters is
critical to achieving implementation. One should also consider providing specific TA to the
banking supervision function in corporate governance issues, so that they would be able to
check if the board and the management of an individual institution has in place processes that
ensure they are fulfilling all their duties and responsibilities.
5 In Estonia, a new law on credit  institutions was passed  in 1999 (effective since 01.07.1999), which devotes a full chapter
on the management and organizational  structure of the bank, describing  inter  alia  the decision making authority of the board
and management,  and the rights and duties of the intemal  control department.  With this law the powers of the board  are
increased and made much more explicit.  Several new concepts were introduced  in the law, like a four-eyes principle,
conflicts of interest, etc. At the same time, the law provides each bank with significant liberty in determining what is the
most suitable structure of the internal control system of each particular bank.
11III.  THE  INGREDIENTS  FOR THE  SUCCESS OF A DEI
3.1  Reforming  a country  and building  a banking  sector  is a complex  process  and it is not
possible to achieve  results with one magical  cure. That is why  the DEI, which can serve as a
significant  impetus to the growth  and stability  of the banking sector,  cannot be successful  if
other supporting  elements  are not in place. Based on the experience  of the Baltic  countries  the
critical elements  of a successful  DEI--whichever  donor were to provide  it--are finding  the
partners  to support implementation,  building an appropriate  organizational  structure  for
managing  the investments,  and determining  that the general economic  conditions  and the
legislative  environment  is suitable  for making  the investments.
Establishing  partners
3.2  Finding partners  helps to avoid inefficiencies  and gains synergies.  There are four
main types of partners  that are critical to a DEI. On the one hand there is the donor country
considering  the establishment  of a DEI. Then there is the partner embodied  in other aid
projects.  Next are other multinational  or bilateral public equity  investors  ready to take
minority stakes in the banks. Finally  there is the active  involvement  of host authorities  that
would serve to increase  the impact  of development  work.
3.3  Investing  into the banking  sector when  the legal environment  has not been established
and the economic  conditions  are unpredictable,  is considered  too risky by foreign  strategic
investors  and, as a result, only speculative  portfolio investments  enter the market. Even for a
country  actively  involved in development  work,  establishing  a DEI would not be easy as
there is a very high likelihood  that the funds  will be lost and / or benefit the wrong  parties.
Only donors from countries  where a political support  to the country  or region  has been
defined  internally  may be willing  to take that risk. The threat of being seen as intruding  into
another  country's affairs,  or as forcing  its own interests  on other country's banking  sector,
can be avoided  by aligning the investments  with another  project coordinated  by an
international  organization.
3.4  In many  cases, because  of the smallness  of the banking  sector,  the costs of paying  for
an extensive  due diligence would  be high relative  to the size of the investment.  Also,
knowledge  of emerging  markets' business  practices  is hard to acquire,  but essential for
adequately  evaluating  the situation  in the banks. Aligning  several  initiatives  and timing them
in order to share the costs of entrance  would provide  a momentum  for the start of the project.
The WB, as one of the likely partners,  is perceived  to have significant  knowledge  in the
developing  economies  and this would facilitate  getting support  to the project.
3.5  In the Baltic countries  comprehensive  due diligence  was undertaken  under the WB
credit lines and the availability  of qualification  criteria--as  well as the due diligence  reports--
was considered  extremely  valuable  by SFM. The sharing of information  between SFM and
the special WB units continued  during  the lifetime of the investments.  That allowed SFM  to
stay a small organisation  with no special  analytical  staff. The only problem  that SFM
encountered  when sharing the information  was the timing of the equity investments  versus
the credit line approvals.  In several  cases the credit line review took longer than anticipated
and if a share issue had been announced  SFM was not able to wait for the final results of the
12due diligence process. Unfortunately, in one of those cases the bank where SFM invested
eventually did not qualify for the WB credit line and, because of the irregular transactions
within that bank, SFM had to make an exit and incurred a loss.
3.6  In the Baltic projects, the DEI was combined with a credit line from the World Bank.
But there are advantages and disadvantages in combining the DEI with a credit line. The
advantages of the credit line have been discussed above. Based on the Baltic experience, four
shortcomings can be identified. Firstly, the window of time available for the establishment of
a WB credit line can be very short. In the Baltic countries, foreign private sector loans to
banks came in very fast after the general legislative framework and macroeconomic stability
was established. These were typically more attractive than WB credit lines. In order to meet
the initial lending targets much effort went into disbursement. Or if the credit line were
cancelled, the whole project could be jeopardized and the disbursement of the equity part
disrupted (this did not happen in Estonia, as the credit line was cancelled after all the equity
investments had been made already). The second main shortcoming is the conflict inherent in
the roles of a shareholder and a lender. Funding by a shareholder (or a party linked to a
shareholder) may not be on the best available terms for the borrowing bank. Need for capital
may not coincide with a need for borrowed funds and excess funding with limited bankable
projects may lead to unwarranted risk-taking. Thirdly, the difference in timing for the
decision making for equity and lending is different, as stated earlier, causing unnecessary
delays. This would be especially visible in a situation where a very rigid link is put in place
between the equity and the credit line6. And fourthly, if a WB credit line is crowding out
private credit lines 7, some disciplining effect on the banks, which a private credit line would
bring along, may be lost. Explicit loan covenants, like a right to call back money, are missing
in the WB credit line and if present would be very hard to enforce for a development agency
(may cause instability in the banking sector).
3.7  Finding other multinational or bilateral public sector equity investors ready to
take minority stakes in the banks is important for several reasons. A public sector fund
wants to avoid being seen as taking the full responsibility  for the future of the bank, both
for political reasons and because the allocated funds would usually not be sufficient if a
serious problem rose. A small stake will be taken, which, however, makes it very
difficult to enforce changes in the bank, as has been noted above. To overcome this,
partners with similar views and objectives need to be sought.
3.8  Since 1995 SFM made about twenty investments and exits in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania (see Table  1). The majority of the investments (about 3/4) had been made in
the form of shares, the remainder as subordinated loans. SFM's portion of the share
capital had not normally been greater than 10 %. In virtually every case the investments
had been made together with international institutions or similar institutions in other EU
countries. The most important co-investors had been EBRD, FMO (Netherlands), DEG
6  In all three countries,  the project  envisaged a rigid link between  the credit line and the equity investment. The initial idea
was to make  equity funds automatically  available after an approval  for a credit  line was achieved. This did not work out for
any of the projects and the SFM was making  its investments  independently,  but based  on the information received  from the
WB projects.
7  Although in practice.  WB credit  lines normally offered medium  to long-term maturities  whereas private credit  lines were
typically short-term.
13(Germany), Finnfund and NIB. This improved the possibility of exerting an influence
through having a significant presence in the board and more voting rights at
shareholder's  level. The role of EBRD, which was the main partner for SFM in equity
investments, should be given special attention in the region. Being the first major lender
as well as an equity investor, it imposed its fairly severe conditions on the institutions it
was investing in and as a result of that, helped to enhance the general banking practices
in the region.
3.9  When comparing the performance of the banks where foreign investors had a
significant presence in the banks (alongside SFM) and where SFM was by itself (or only
together with domestic investors) the former ones have been able to demonstrate better
financial results. No doubt different factors were influencing the outcome, but good nrsk
management,  as a result of imposing sound corporate governance, certainly had a
significant impact. 8
3.10  There is also potential for further increasing the development impact through making
a special effort to actively involve host authonrties.  Valuable information is available to both
sides but when not shared, the effectiveness of the work may be reduced. The expenrence
with the Baltic projects showed that the lack of cooperation between the supervisory agency
and the WB unit may cause rivalry in communicating with the banks, which is likely to
undermine the position of the supervisory agency. The parties involved would usually state as
a reason the strict confidentiality rules of the supervisory authority, which limit the possibilitv
for open communication, as well as the low level of knowledge among supervisors, which
makes it difficult to fully involve them. As a result, the traditional TA of supplying advisors
to the supervisory agency is used. But there are training opportunities available, for example
within the process of doing the due diligence and assessing the risks within the bank tor the
eligibility under the credit line. It could serve as a practical training in both on-site work as
well as in off-site analysis. Also, the concept of connected lending and large exposures that
were considered critical in assessing the suitability of banks for the credit line, were not
rigorously enforced initially by the supervisory authorities. Transferring knowledge about
their importance, as well as introducing the supervisory methods, would have helped to
identify earlier some of the problem banks.
Building an appropriate organizational structure
3.11  Establishing an appropriate structure for managing a DEI is very important. It allows
the right incentive structure to be implemented, involving the right skills. It also enables the
8  To illustrate this argument  three banks have been compared. Eesti Uhispank (EYP), the second biggest bank in Estonia,  is
one of the less successful examples.  The SFM initially held (at the end of 1995) a 17% share, but was gradually diluted  to
less than 5% (the other foreign  investors were GDR holders)  and its representative  was the only foreigner  in the board before
the strategic  investor had entered. The financial  results of EYP have fallen below expectations,  with  losses both in 1998 and
in 2000 (1998 EPS -I  EUR,  1999 0.2 EUR, 2000 -0.2  EUR). As a contrast to it, Vi]niaus Bankas (which had already in
1996 87.5% of its shareholders  foreign institutional  investors  and the majority of the board  comprised  of the representatives
of foreign  investors) had been profitable  in the same period (1998 EPS  1.2 EUR, 1999 EPS 1.4 EUR and 2000 EPS  1.6
EUR). Unibanka showed losses in 1998 (EPS -I  EUR), due to the exposures  taken to the Russian  market,  but since then, has
been showing good results (1999 EPS 0.5 EUR, 2000 EPS I.6 EUR). Its shareholder  structure  has been foreign  investor
dominated  (over 50% owned  by foreign  institutional  investors).
14institution to be managed based on commercial principles, helping to give the investment a
clear focus and ensures that the flexibility in investment decisions is maintained.
3.12  Adopting a commercial approach to the management of the DEI, and also realizing
the risks of the investment, are critical in many aspects. First of all, good corporate
governance can only be imposed through a profit-oriented equity investment which aims at
increasing shareholder value. If investment performance is not considered important, the
motives of the representatives of such as investment can be questioned by other shareholders
on the board, especially when trying to adopt changes that would work in the long-term
interests of all shareholders. The continuous adaptation of performance targets, protective
covenants  in investment contracts, as well as the involvement of high-level banking skills and
flexibility in investment decisions, are some of the useful elements that can be put in place, if
a commercial approach is adopted.
3.13  Setting profit targets for DEI, but balancing them with the readiness to lose the
investment, is necessary is an appropriate objective.  It should be stressed that no investment
will take place under the difficult initial circumstances if the short-term performance
measurement starts to dominate development goals. On the other hand, the investment needs
to be reviewed on a regular basis and the objectives and the Retum on Equity (ROE) targets
should be changed during the project in order to increase discipline and avoid unnecessary
losses. If stability is achieved, there is no reason to keep the ROE targets low or
undetermined. Performance targets also help to neutralize pressures from the recipient
country's  authorities to have the DEI investor act as an "investor of last resort", saving them
from the embarrassment caused by a bank failure.
3.14  In the case of the Baltic experience, the Government of Sweden wanted, as far as
was possible, to receive a reasonable return but realized that risk capital in its true sense
was involved. The support element was in making funds available at a time when the
market could not help. The contribution was to be for a limited period accompanied by a
requirement for insight and inspection. The management of the fund was supposed to be
undertaken by a body with professional banking skills, which could act independently.
The fund was established as a subsidiary company under Swedfund International with
its own board.  Its financial results were published in the annual report of Swedfund
International. The financial performance of SFM exceeded an expectations (see Box 3).
15Box 3. Swedfund Financial  Markets  AB
Swedfund  Financial  Markets  (SFM) was established  as a wholly-owned  subsidiary  company  of
Swedfund  International  AB, which is a state owned  risk capital  company  providing  capital  and know-how  for
investments  in the developing  countries.  The company  was commissioned  by the Swedish  Government  to
contribute  to the development  of the financial  sector in the Baltic states  by providing  capital and know-how.
For this purpose  the Government  of Sweden  made available a sum of SEK 240 million. During  its operations
SFM had an average of two employees.  Administrative  and legal services  were offered  by the parent
company.  SFM had its own Board  of Directors and the Managing  Director  was  a banker with extensive
commercial  banking experience.
At the end of 1996  SFM had invested SEK 155.2  million  in twelve  banks in the three Baltic
countries.  No write-downs  or sales were made during  the financial  year.  The year's result was a loss of SEK
272 932.  This result included  costs of technical cooperation  amounting  to SEK 3.5 million.
At the end of 1997,  the SFM  portfolio  at book value  was SEK 199 million.  During the year, two
equity investments  had been divested.  SEK 1.6  million of an equity investment  had been written down.  The
financial year's profit was SEK I I million,  which had been charged  with a SEK 1.6  million costs for
technical assistance.
At the end of 1998  the book value  of the investments  had fallen  to SEK 187.5  million. During  the
year, holdings in three banks  had been sold. An equity investment  and a subordinated  loan totalling SEK 27.3
million had been written off in its entirety.  Three other equity investments  and the interests on loans had been
written down by SEK 16.4  million  to market value, all due to the impact  of the Russian  financial  crises on the
region.
1999  was a successful  year for SFM.  Shares in two banks were sold and the book value of the
remaining  investments  (five equity  investments  and four subordinated  loans)  was SEK 171  million. The
profit for the financial  year was SEK  40 million.
Year 2000 was the year  when all the remaining  investments  had been sold. The profit made for the
financial  year was SEK 188 million.  Despite  the losses  in 1998,  the average  annual ROE  was 15%.
3.15  Often  private  investors,  when  they  enter  into  a lending  agreement  with  a bank
from an emerging market, prescribe specific performance targets and reporting routines.
With equity investments, restrictions are imposed on the management in their business
decisions (e.g. exposure limits), and a board membership is required. Such conditions
can have a beneficial effect as they are often stricter than those prescribed by law and
support the efforts of the supervisory agency.  SFM did not have any special
requirements, other than the board membership.  If a DEI were to be replicated in the
future, consideration should be given to taking more rights.  A DEI might have
somewhat more flexibility than for instance EBRD or IFC with their very standardized
contracts and can tailor the requirements to address the specific needs of a particular
market.  Too few requirements by a DEI can make it more favored by the banks at the
expense of other multinational organizations.  As a result an opportunity to impose
market discipline is missed.
3.16  Involving high quality banking skills to manage the investment is critical if a
commercial approach to a DEI is adopted. This may not necessarily be the case with aid
projects, as they are usually managed by people with very good experience in development
work, but with only some financial sector exposure. Participating in a bank's  board, with an
objective to implement corporate governance, requires solid banking experience. Good
insight is needed for the investment decisions, for surfacing connected lending and large
16exposures, for assessing the level of professionalism, and for detecting corruption in the
management.
3.17  Considerable  flexibility in the investment guidelines (i.e. exposure limits and
diversification requirements) is needed for a DEI. Only after due diligence can suitable banks
be identified, the number of which may turn out to be much smaller than initially envisaged,
making diversification hard to achieve. Fine-tuning is necessary to find a right balance
between focus and diversification, as investing in several banks within a competitive market
may cause tension, raising concerns about confidentiality and conflicts of interest issues.
Concentrating on few institutions would permit the DEI to make a bigger and more
sustainable impact. Often banks with foreign investments develop into leading institutions in
the market, as they have the benefit of adequate capitalisation and access to funding. When
there are other international financial institutions already present in the market, a DEI could
invest in a bank which perhaps has not received a foreign investment yet. This would
facilitate increased competition and a more balanced and diverse banking market. On the
other hand, when investments are made in several banks in a transition country, the much
needed consolidation process can be supported or even initiated. This way a DEI can play an
important role in shaping the banking market.
3.18  SFM made about twenty investments in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see Table
1). Equity was invested in three banks in Estonia, four banks in Latvia and four banks in
Lithuania. In Estonia, out of the three investments two were divested within about a
year, leaving SFM with one major investment in the country. Both in Latvia and
Lithuania, one bank was divested in the first year and holdings were kept for at least two
years or longer in three remaining banks. Also in both countries two of the banks, where
the SFM had made the investments, subsequently merged. SFM had also taken steps to
institute regional co-operation between the banks, thus facilitating the entrance of
strategic investors.9 When SFM was making its investments in the banking sector, it was
well aware of the potential conflict of interest and made sure that the same person was
not representing SFM in different banks in the same market. That considerably reduced
anxiety among the banks, as it was taken as a demonstration of good intentions.
3.19  When planning a DEI, the project should not be overburdened with several objectives.
Often there are high expectations from both the partners (i.e. other donors providing TA to
that particular region) as well as the recipient country. Accordingly the DEI can be made
responsible for delivering and coordinating TA to the individual institutions. Instead, a DEI
should primarily be used for supporting at the board level the TA provided by other
institutions. This would not divert its focus from corporate governance work, an area that can
be effectively addressed only from within an institution.
9  In 1998, Swedish  Skandinaviska  Enskilda  Banken bought  a controlling  stake in Vilniaus  Bank, Unibank and Eesti
Uhispank. The three banks had entered into a partnership  agreement  the previous year with an objective  to support each
others clients with offering banking  services. Such cooperation  helped  them avoid inefficient expansion costs which would
have otherwise been made  in order to acquire a pan-Baltic  presence.
17Sale Value
Investments  Acquisition  & Exit
(min SEK)  Value & Date  Date  Co-financier/final investor
ESTONIA
Tallinna Pank  6.5 (1995)  21.5 (1997)  Co-investor FMO, Exit to market
Estonian  8.7 (1997)  19.1 (1998)  EBRD, DEG, Finnfund, sale to management
Investment Bank  .
Uhispank  40.7 (1995, 1997)  66.2 (2000)  Sale to SEB
LATVIA
Latvian  6.9 (1997)  10.2 (1997)  EBRD, DEG, Finnfund, sale to Finnfund
Investment Bank
Latvijas Zemes  7.4 (1996)  8.2 (1998)  EBRD, sale to Hoiupunk
Banka
Unibanka  47.6 (1996, 1998)  94.5 (2000)  EBRD, sale to SEB
Riga Commercial  18.5 (1996)  0.3 (2000)  EBRD,  sale to Norddeutsche Landesbank
Bank
LITHUANIA  _  _  _  _
Lithuanian  10.1 (1997)  10.5 (1998)  EBRD, DEG, NIB, sale to NIB
Development
Bank
Bankas Hermis  22.1 (1997)  42.2 (2000)  EBRD, sale to Vilniaus Banka
UKIO Bankas  6.8 (1997)  4.1 (1999)  Exit to market
Vilniaus Bankas  17.7 (1995, 1996)  124.3 (2000)  DEG, sale to SEB
SUBORDINATED
LOANS (mln SEK)
Hansapank  13.5  Taken over from Hoiupank, fully repaid
Uhispank  9.0  Taken over from Tallinna Pank, fully repaid
Maapank  9.0  EBRD co-investor,  written off
Vilniaus Bankas  40.0  _
183.20  Special caution is necessary with the expectations the host financial authorities may
have in the case of the emergence of financial distress in a bank. Competence to initiate
major restructuring is not necessarily available in a DEI and that is why investments should
not be made into ailing institutions, which might rely on a DEI to provide them with a
recovery plan. Also, if problems arise during the time the DEI has been made, the authorities
should not expect a DEI to bail out the bank or to take a lead in restructuring efforts.
Determining an adequate environment for investment
3.21  It is not easy to determine the right environment and preconditions for a DEI project.
At minimum, one would look for general political stability and commitment to reforms and
fiscal discipline. The privatisation  of small and medium sized enterprises should also have
been started and the legal acts providing protection to property rights need to be in place. For
the banking specific environment, the development of a modem banking law has to be
progressing and an accounting law in line with international standards has to be passed or be
under preparation. The independent auditing profession has to be established and the banking
supervision function should have adequate powers and independence to act.
3.22  One needs to be careful, though, not to overemphasize the progress that has to be
achieved by the time an investment is made. For the Baltic projects, several preconditions had
been set. But even when not all the initially envisaged reforms had been fully implemented,
the project still proceeded further in order not to loose the development effect of an equity
investment. A delay might have also resulted in losing the development momentum in the
banking sector, thereby making the whole reform process more costly and less efficient.
3.23  In hindsight, when analyzing the Baltic experience, the conditions appear to have
been suitable for a development oriented equity project. Firstly, modem  company and
banking laws, providing a basis for imposing corporate governance and the enforcement of
shareholder rights, had been, or were in the process of being passed. Secondly, the countries
had demonstrated their commitment towards macroeconomic stability, which provided the
necessary confidence among the entrepreneurial community for the initiation of long-term
investment projects after profit opportunities from large-scale price distortions vanished.
Thirdly, the privatization of the small and medium-sized enterprises had been mostly
completed. And, fourthly, despite the fact that the whole banking sector was not yet in the
private hands, there was a significant number of private banks operating without public
subsidies and interference. These four factors together provided the legal security, demand
for traditional banking products, as well as the necessary clients and providers of such
products. Additional benefits were incurred from areas like bankruptcy laws, which imposed
a necessary discipline on the enterprises in payments (from mortgage and collateral laws).
This served as a guarantee to the enforcement of claims against defaulting borrowers as well
as from ownership registers, which help provide assurance about property rights.
3.24  The timing of DEI investments is of critical importance. In countries where domestic
capital accumulation is poor because of low domestic savings mobilization, foreign
investments have a big catalytic role to play. Reforming countries with bigger economies are
in a better position to attract foreign investments, as the size of future revenues cover the
19transaction costs. In the case of smaller countries, it is a serious challenge to attract strategic
investors, especially to the banking sector.
3.25  In the Baltic countries extensive TA had been provided and, as a result, by  1996 the
main legal acts like commercial and central banking laws, laws on accounting, etc. were in
placel.  But long-term foreign investors also need confidence that the regulations are
followed by the business community and that the authorities are consistently enforcing them
In order to be convinced of it, a track record of several years is needed. This is when a DEI,
which is initiated in parallel with the TA projects, can make a sustainable impact. This can be
followed at a later stage by  the DEI being a counterpart to a potential strategic investor in the
discussion of the future investmentsl 1
3.26  The entrance of foreign strategic investors into the Baltic banking market by DEI was
well timed. However a question had been raised, especially for Estonia, whether it had been
too late, as the credit line, which was a part of the project, was not fully disbursed and the
market developed so fast that there were plenty of funds available from private sources. But
in Estonia, as well as in Latvia and Lithuania--even for leading institutions--credit funds from
private sources became available much earlier than equity investments. Strategic investments
into the banking sector did not come before 1998, indicating that the environment was
considered too unstable for private long-terrn equity. Short-term financial investment were
available (GDR issues and local stock exchange listings were initiated by major banks in all
three countries starting as early as in 1996), but were very volatile in nature, especially in a
context where these were no capital controls and a readily available exit mechanism through
the stock market.
10  Several improvements were made in the later years to bring the legislation  into full conformity with the EU directives.  In
some instances,  like in the case of Estonia, it resulted in the full rewriting  of the Law  on Credit Institutions  (became  effective
in 1999).
11  In the case of the Baltic projects  the presence  of SFM supported the entrance of Swedish  investors and helped them
make decisions  faster. In 1998, after the August  1998 Russian crises,  Skandinaviska  Enskilda  Banken (SEB)  from Sweden
acquired a strategic stake in three commercial banks in each Baltic state. Since the acquisition,  they have continuously
increased  their share in the banks'  share capital.  By 2000, over 95% of the shares have been acquired by SEB in each of
these banks.
20IV.  CONCLUSION
4.1  The analysis of the World Bank and the Government of Sweden joint assistance
projects clearly demonstrates that a DEI is an effective instrument for providing support in
emerging countries with a shortage of capital and banking expertise. The possibility to
impose sound corporate governance on the emerging banking institutions through a DEI can
significantly  enhance the quality of the banking sector. The analysis undertaken within the
framework of this study has shown that the level of banking skills-- because of the structure
of the industry itself, as well as its shareholders and board members-- is very low in the
starting years. The initial character of the banking business, specifically undertaking trade
finance instead of project finance, does not provide much of a learning experience in real
banking and as a result serious problems may grow on the books of the commercial banks.
The inadequacy of loan loss provisioning and other undisclosed risks (which result from
imprudent risk-taking possible due to poor banking regulation and the lack of management
information systems) would lead to a situation in which the level of capitalization cannot be
sufficient to absorb future losses. Unfortunately, often none of this is understood either by the
financial authorities or the public, partly also because of the poor quality of auditing work.
4.2  There is no doubt that the TA work undertaken in the Baltic countries had a
significant impact in correcting some of the shortcomings. TA to govemment has been
helpful in establishing a regulatory environment. In the case of the World Bank projects,
direct TA to the banks had been a major success, as substantial and effective work was done
through the Bank's  special units within the framework of the credit lines.
4.3  But in addition to the success, there are also areas where the TA cannot have
sufficient impact. The key challenge is in changing business practices. TA to the banking
supervision function does not provide immediate results as it takes a long time to train a
supervisor and generate the trust and respect of the banking industry. The only way to make a
sustainable impact, and achieve a change in business practices, is through sound corporate
governance imposed by the shareholders from within the institutions. The analysis of the
Baltic countries showed that despite the good intentions and much effort there are several
areas where changes are very hard to enforce when a shareholder would have a minority. The
case of SFM can be used to illustrate this argument. Despite the difficulties, progress was
made with improving transparency, communication with shareholders, and in managing
conflict of interest situations. But more progress would have been achieved if corporate
govemance,  as an instrument to initiate changes, had been recognized also by other parties.
4.4  The SFM experience also highlighted several areas that would be critical in achieving
success with a DEI. Above all, it is the choice of right partners. A suitable donor for a DEI is
a country with political support and strategic interest in the region. Partnering with other aid
programs helps to decrease transaction costs. In addition, other multinational or bilateral
public equity investors ready to take minority stakes are needed, as it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to initiate changes with having a minority stake. And it would also be helpful to
pay special attention to communication with host authorities to increase support and pursue
development objective, as there are several learning opportunities during such complex aid
projects.
214.5  Building an appropriate organizational structure is important in order to adopt a
commercial approach. The SFM project is a good example where a return was expected but
the riskiness of the investment was fully understood by the government. With profit targets
tougher covenants in investment contracts are imposed, which helps to introduce corporate
govemance in situations when management is not cooperating. It also helps to bring on board
high-level banking skills, which are the only way to spot fraud and impose effective board
supervision. At the same time maintaining flexibility in investment decisions is important, as
it can have a powerful effect on the way the banking market is developing. Providing a clear
focus through not getting involved in TA, but instead using corporate governance for
achieving development objectives, is critical in achieving better results. As a result, the
financial results of SFM were much better than initially expected.
4.6  The issue of what is the right environment for a DEI, and what is the most appropriate
time for the investment, is not an easy one. Having the basic regulations in place is necessary,
but waiting too long may result in losing the development momentum. The Baltic
environment and timing seemed to have been right, as was also proven by the time the
foreign investors actually entered the market. The SFM was able to divest its investments and
declare its goals in the Baltic banking sector fulfilled.
22References
Staff Appraisal Report, Financial Institution Development Project, Estonia, September 15,
1994
Staff Appraisal Report, Enterprise and Financial Sector Restructuring Project, Republic of
Latvia, August 16, 1994
Staff Appraisal Report, Enterprise and Financial Sector Assistance Project, Republic of
Lithuania, March 27, 1995
Implementation Completion Report, Financial Institution Development Project, Estonia,
November 30, 1998
Implementation Completion Report on a Single Currency and Currency Pool Loan in the
Amount of US$  10, DM 8.5, and US$20 Million to the Republic Of Latvia for and
Enterprise and Financial Sector Restructuring Project, March 14, 2000
Implementation Completion Report, Enterprise and Financial Sector Assistance Project,
Republic of Lithuania, February 6, 2001
Annual Reports 1996 - 2000, Eesti Uhispank
Annual Reports 1996 - 2000, Latvijas Unibanka
Annual Reports 1996 - 2000, Vilniaus Bankas
Annual Reports, 1995/96 - 1999, Swedfund International AB
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial
Level, 1999
Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations, The Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2000
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, The Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, 1997
23Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2706  Household Income Dynamics  Jyotsna Jalan  November 2001  C. Cunanan
in Rural China  Martin Ravallion  32301
WPS2707  Financial Intermediary Development  Thorsten Beck  November 2001  A. Yaptenco
and Growth Volatility: Do  Mattias Lundberg  38526
Intermediaries Dampen or Magnify  Giovanni Majnoni
Shocks?
WPS2708  Accountability and Corruption:  Daniel Lederman  November 2001  P. Soto
Political Institutions Matter  Norman Loayza  37892
Rodrigo Reis Soares
WPS2709  Explaining Leakage of Public Funds  Ritva Reinikka  November  2001  H. Sladovich
Jakob  Svensson  37698
WPS2710  Breaking up the Collective Farm:  Martin Ravallion  November 2001  C. Cunanan
Welfare Outcomes of Vietnam's  Dominique van de Walle  32301
Massive Land Privatization
WPS2711  Identifying Class Size Effects in  Miguel Urquiola  November 2001  H. Sladovich
Developing Countries:  Evidence from  37698
Rural Schools in Bolivia
WPS2712  Contract Risks and Credit Spread  Mansoor Dailami  November 2001  W. Nedrow
Determinants in the International  Robert Hauswald  31585
Project Bond Market
WPS2713  Causes of Inequality in Health:  Adam Wagstaff  November 2001  H. Sladovich
Who You Are? Where You Live?  Pierella Paci  37698
Or Who Your Parents Were?  Heather Joshi
WPS2714  On Decomposing the Causes of  Adam Wagstaff  November 2001  H. Sladovich
Health Sector Inequalities with an  Eddy van Doorslaer  37698
Application to Malnutrition Inequalities Naoko Watanabe
in Vietnam
WPS2715  Paying for Health Care: Quantifying  Adam Wagstaff  Novemoer 2001  H. Sladovich
Fairness, Catastrophe, and  Eddy van Doorslaer  37698
Impoverishment, with Applications to
Vietnam, 1993-98
WPS2716  Does Foreign Bank Penetration  George R. G. Clarke  November 2001  P. Sintim-Aboan,,e-
Reduce Access to Credit in  Robert Cull  37644
Developing Countries? Evidence  Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
from Asking BorrowersPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2717  Bridging  the Economic  Divide  within  Raja  Shankar  November  2001  A. Santos
Nations:  A Scorecard  on the  Anwar  Shah  31675
Performance  of Regional  Development
Policies  in Reducing  Regional  Income
Disparities
WPS2718 Liberalizing  Basic  Carsten  Fink  November  2001  R. Simms
Telecommunications:  The  Asian  Aaditya  Mattoo  37156
Experience  Randeep  Rathindran
WPS2719 Is There a Positive  Incentive  Effect  Truman  G. Packard  November  2001  T. Packard
from Privatizing  Social  Security?  89078
Evidence  from Latin  America
WPS272()  International  Migration  and  the Global Andres  Solimano  November  2001  A. Bonfield
Economic  Order:  An Overview  31248
WPS272' Implications  for South Asian  Countries  Sanjay  Kathuria  November  2001  M. Kasilag
of Abolishing  the Multifibre  Will Martin  39081
Arrangement  Anjali  Bhardwaj
WPS2722  Japan's  Official  Development  Masahiro  Kawai  November  2001  J. Mendrofa
Assistance:  Recent  Issues  and  Shinji  Takagi  81885
Future  Directions